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THE CANADA/U.S. ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP: FROM FTA
TO NAFTA TO ???
Derek H. Burneyt
Canadian Speaker
Let me say that it was refreshing for me, as a bureaucrat, to actually have
somebody in the Minister of Trades office doing something like trade. You
will appreciate that while the challenges of Canada-U.S. relations occupied a
pretty healthy part of my government life, they have been remote, although
not completely absent, from my current duties. I say this up front just in case
there may be a CAE shareholder in the audience wondering what on the earth
I am doing here. I wanted to cover that one right up front.
But, returning to this topic, it is an addiction of sorts for those of us in
Canada who served in the trenches. It is one that can even generate
headaches if you stay away too long. So I am very encouraged that the
subject itself seems to be coming back into vogue even though the climate
today is much different than when the agenda was set.
I certainly congratulate you and the Institute on what is now a much more
daunting topic for all of us. As you said last night, let it continue, because
events in Iraq have definitely thrown Canada-U.S. relations into a snow
bank, and I doubt that the spring is going to bring any immediate relief.
Many of you know Canadians can be almost obsessed with the
relationship of the United States and the obsession is not always positive. We
do worry about what America will do with its awesome power. We can
express a high moral attitude of concern from time to time while maintaining
an equally lofty position of flexible detachment from global challenges,
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which is why Dean Atchison once described Canada as being like the stem
voice of the daughter of God.'
U.S. action in Iraq has brought these sentiments to the floor in Canada.
Distance, differentiation, and detachment appear to be more popular appeal
than engagement these days. In my view it need not come to this. Americans,
among others, might be wondering why it has. With a little more dexterity
and a modicum of coherence, I believe Canada could and should find a way
to be supportive of its neighbor; especially in response to what the United
States declared was a direct security threat. Canada did not have to
contribute our armed forces. Moral support would have sufficed. We
actually have more troops in the region providing indirect support than most
members of the coalition.
Instead, we chose not to join the U.S. action, citing this is the inherent
right of an "independent" or "sovereign" country,2 as Bob Hage was
reminding us earlier. Sovereignty and independence are sensitive issues in
Canada. The Canadian government's decision was, in my view, ill
considered and the timing was unhelpful. Indiscriminate and undisciplined
remarks by government representatives only made matters worse.
In any event, optimists might suggest that the split over Iraq makes a bold
bilateral issue more timely. The theory being that times of real crisis
provoke radical thinking. Pessimists, on the other hand, will see the prospects
as more remote now than ever. When I think about what next for this
relationship, not surprisingly, my first instincts are more cautious than
courageous; all the more so because of the emotions now running. Benign
neglect is a phrase often used to describe Washington's attitude toward its
northern neighbor. Henry, you spoke about this last night, but the neglect has
been replaced recently by publicly expressed disappointment and most likely
less polite private reactions.
Canadian attitudes towards our southern neighbor represent a
kaleidoscope of very different sentiments from warm to wary with many,
many points in between. We crave differentiation, in part, because there is no
distance between us and increasingly, less difference. That is also a major
reason why Canadian political leaders can be very reluctant to take on major
initiatives with the United States; more to lose than gain in terms of public
approval, regardless of the intrinsic merit.
This also helps explain Canada's ambivalence over Iraq. We share
geography, as well as many basic values, but because of neglect on the one
1 Margaret MacMillan, A New Foregin Policy ? Not Necessarily, NAT'L POST, available
at www.canada.com/national/features/foreignfields/story.html?id=02A48B96-77FD-42 1 5-9F
EF- 192BD3F23492
2 Stephen Thorne, Update: Alliance motion defeated, CAN. PRESS, April 8, 2003,
available at 2003 WL 18254077.
[Vol. 29:43
2
Canada-United States Law Journal, Vol. 29 [2003], Iss. 1, Art. 12
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cuslj/vol29/iss1/12
Burney--From FTA to NAFTA to ???
hand and extreme sensitivity on the other, we both tend to employ our
common border more as a barrier than as a bridge. This is what I think
Stephen Flynn was implying earlier this morning. With notable exceptions,
we tend to shy away from old ways to harness the proximity to our mutual
advantage. There were certainly days when the Free Trade Agreement
(FTA)3 seemed to be a bridge too far, both for Canada and the United States.
As for NAFTA,4 there was a time, initially, when it did not seem like
either the United States or Mexico wanted Canada on the bridge and many
Canadians thought the same way. But somehow, both got done, against the
odds, a lot of emotion, and a lopsided mixture of fierce opposition and gross
indifference. That leads me to believe more may now be possible, even if it
may not be any time soon.
An attempt at next steps will be hobbled not just by emotions over Iraq,
but by a more deep-seated suspicion in some quarters in Canada about
sacrifices of sovereignty and by a profound lack of interest or more likely, a
distinct lack of priority in Washington. We faced both of those hurdles on the
FTA. NAFTA actually generated more of a political challenge in the United
States then it did Canada.
The smart border initiatives and its side agreements have been beneficial,5
but remember that these were intended primarily to restore the degree of
openness we previously had or thought we had at the border before
September 11 th . I am not discounting the value of new technologies being
used, but does anyone really believe entry through our common border has
become better, let alone smarter?
If anything, we are seeing examples of tighter, not looser, arrangements at
all border points for all people and goods. All in the name of security in a
changed environment. Hillary Clinton reminded us of this when she said
American national security trumps international trade. I was reminded of
this a couple weeks ago on a family trip. I have one of my sons living in the
United States and I was visiting with my wife and her family in Mexico. On
the drive back from Mexico we crossed at a very sleepy border point in
Arizona. When the fellow came to the car and his first question was "Ya'll
Americans?" My son said proudly, as Canadians tend to do, "No, there are
three Canadians." To which the guard replied, "Out of the car." Out of the
car we marched. He said, "Into the immigration office." It was quite a ways
from where the highway was. We marched into the immigration office. I
3 United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 12, 1987, U.S.- Can., 27 I.L.M. 281
(1988).
4 North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Mex.- Can., 32 I.L.M. 605.
5 Smart Border Declaration: Building a Smart Border for the 21" Century on the
Foundation of a North American Zone of Confidence, CANADIAN EMBASSY, Dec. 12, 2001,
available at www.canadianembassy.org/border/declaration-en.asp
2003]
3
Burney: The Canada/U.S. Economic Relationship: From FTA to NAFTA To - Can
Published by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons, 2003
CANADA-UNITED STATES LA WJOURNAL
said to the fellow when I got in there, "Gee, I used to think we were
neighbors." He said, "Neighbors? You're foreign." It reminded me a bit of
that old movie Protocol with Goldie Hawn when she was applying for a job
in the State Department and they asked her if she ever traveled to a foreign
country and she said, "No. I went to Canada once, but it's not really foreign.
It's kind of attached, isn't it?"
A major complicating factor for any new initiative is obviously the huge
power imbalance between Canada and the United States. In a way, that is
what feeds the sensitivity in Canada and the neglect, benign, or otherwise, in
the United States. Many of us who spend time managing Canada's relations
with the U.S. concluded that the best antidote to this power imbalance and
the chronic neglect were agreements in shrinking rules with equal
application; obligation for both parties. There is no nirvana with this
objective, but practical benefits can be derived from agreements that allow
for greater predictability and enable the flow of goods, services, and people
to be less vulnerable to capricious or politically tainted decisions.
Essentially, I am talking about the rule of law, instead of the rule of might, or
the rule of the mighty. A point I thought would resonate well with so many
lawyers in the audience.
Non-visaging rules simply generate a non-protracted interpretation and
time-consuming legal wrangling. In fact, it is this kind of wrangling and
never ending hassle that undermines the otherwise positive impact of
NAFTA.6  The rules should be clear and consistent; underpinning the
purposes of whatever agreement has been negotiated, with lawyers engaged
as a last and not the first resort. Sorry, as many of you know I am not a
lawyer. Practical, even logical, you might say, but neither is easy to achieve
or explain. What we need most for any bold initiative is a clear sense of di-
rection or leadership from the political level. This, undoubtedly, is the most
difficult commodity to muster in today's atmosphere. However, it was what
really made the difference for the FTA and for NAFTA.
It will be one thing to ignite serious interest at the political level in
Canada, but we do have a change of leadership on the horizon, all be it, not a
change of government. That provides an opportunity to turn the page and
possibly, write a new chapter. Some fence mending may be more necessary
in the short-term,7 but that involves repair not renovation. Nonetheless, the
prospect of arousing interest in Washington will prove even more daunting.
Washington is a very busy place where the seemingly urgent often triumphs
6 NAFTA Works for America, Administrative Update on the North American Free Trade
Agreement 1993-1998, U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, available at www.ustr.gov/nafta
report/home.htm
7 Steven Edwards, War in Iraq, NAT'L POST, March 27, 2003, at A4, available at 2003
WL 17381553.
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over the important. Unfortunately, even on a scale of importance, relations
with Canada do not rank prominently. We may be part of the neighborhood,
but we are very rarely top of mind. Obviously, the war in Iraq and the fallout
will be all-consuming in terms of priority and attention for some time to
come. But even if that not were the case, it would seem that the United
States has little desire to reopen what it perceives to be as working with
Canada.
Other initiatives on the trade side there is the Doha Round; the perennial
dispute over agricultural subsidies, new bilateral free trade agreements, and
even a hemispherical free trade agreement.8 All issues that command more
priority. I want to stress that to be successful any major initiative requires a
mutual and sustaining commitment from the very top. The very top is an
expression that is composed of positive ingredients that are different in our
respective political systems. The parliamentary system can deliver
expeditiously under confident, majority leadership.
The U.S. system, let me say diplomatically, is more complicated. I
remember too well that the free trade initiative was almost stillborn because
on the day of the Senate Finance Committee's decision vote to launch the
negotiation, the result was a 10-10 tie.9 In part, because one Senator chose
that day to send the Regan Administration a message concerning the use of
slave labor in the Soviet Union. As a result, he voted against the negotiations
of the FTA. Washington can be a bit like that.
The intellectual underpinnings of a Royal Commission in Canada from a
U.S. think tank would be highly useful. Also necessary is persistent dialog
and support from dedicated teams of officials and from some significant
stakeholders who see the need as well as the benefit of doing something
more. Recognizing the obvious impediments or hurdles, especially in today's
climate, I believe that there is hope for a robust, bilateral agenda; one that
goes beyond economic issues. So here is what I would suggest. First and
foremost, assuming that internal security remains Washington's priority for
some time to come, there is a chance that a concrete proposal from Canada to
strengthen North American security might attract interest, if not attention, in
Washington. It might also help mend the major breach resulting from recent
differences over Iraq. It would involve new levels of cooperation and
commitments governing defense, intelligence and police cooperation. You
have got lots of flavor of what is needed there from the earlier discussion. It
might include harmonized or at least common procedures to handle
immigration and refugee policies; balancing our individual needs with our
8 David Crane, Why the world trading system matters to Canada, TORONTO STAR, Feb. 5,
2003, at E2, available at 2003 WL 12871509.
9 Administration Wins Narrow Victory to Gain Fast-Track Authority for Free Trade
Talks, 3 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) Apr. 30, 1986, at 565.
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mutual desire for greater physical security. As our former Prime Minister
Brian Mulroney said at NAFTA's tenth anniversary, and I quote "If we want
our internal border to be smart, we must make our external border more
secure."'
0
There is no question whether Canada should do more on defense in order
to participate more effectively in preserving its own national security. That
is after all the national assertion of sovereignty. We accept quietly the U.S.
guarantee of security without paying much of a price ourselves. Above all, I
believe Canada needs to signal in words and deeds that the terrorist threats
are real and that better security is imperative. We also need to target our
defense spending and policy in a manner that strengthens North American
security.
The quid pro quo for cooperation on physical security would be an
equally ambitious initiative on the economic front beginning with the new
approach on trade remedy. This eluded us in the past and I know too well
that the United States will guard jealously the unilateral advantage of its
existing trade remedy regime; what we used to call its weapons of mass
destruction. I know the United States perceives no need for relief from
Canadian trade remedy rules, but to be frank, any attempt to broaden what
we now have on trade without reducing the scope for protracted disputes
should have little appeal to Canada. If we chart any new avenues of
cooperation, we must first of all fix what is not working today.
Although the statistics provide a compellingly positive story about the
impact of NAFTA on all three partners," punitive and seemingly perennial
duties against Canadian softwood lumber and more recently against our
wheat exports have sullied the ardor of that success for many in Canada.
Most notably in western Canada, which was traditionally the region most
attracted to free trade. I suspect the negative affects of these disputes may
retard enthusiasm for the next moves. There is a whiff of might is right at
play, which many fear will prevail no matter what rules or agreements are
concluded. The failure to resolve or contain these disputes also reflects the
lack of commitment and constructive chemistry at the top level of
governments today.
The idea on trade remedy might be common definitions of countervail
and anti-dumping, but the different weight or significance of trade in our two
10 Scott Miller, Former Leaders Bush, Mulroney and Salinas Celebrate NAFTA's lOth
Anniversary, WASHINGTON FILE, DEPT. OF STATE, Dec. 9, 2002, available at
http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ar/trade/02120903.htm
1 Robert B. Zoellick's Address to the National Foreign Trade Council, U.S. Trade
Representative (July 26, 2001), available at www.ustr.gov/speechtest/zoellick/
zoellick_7.PDF
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economies frustrated previous attempts to move in that direction. It may be a
sectoral approach with industries working together, for example, on steel to
try to develop common or better understandings of permissible subsidies that
would lead to a more general framework.
In more and more products, Canadian and American firms are competing
in one industry in a single integrated market. Trade remedy laws should
accommodate that reality, especially during the injury determination process.
We could also try to tackle the trade remedy problem by exploring the
prospect for common anti-trust and competition policy. Common
competition and anti-trust regimes certainly help ensure a healthier, more
certain platforms for investment, as well as for production and distribution; a
genuinely level playing field.
There may be other ways to get the desired result on trade remedies.
Some are suggesting a parallel approach to resource management; implying
that we really have a softwood lumber problem more than a trade remedy
problem. Regardless of how we reach the objective it is essential that we
resolve the current disputes in an equitable matter and remove the uncertainty
as well the threats that are inherent in the current system. We must examine
all possible means of providing greater certainty for the future.
Secondly, on the economic front, a move towards a common external
tariff would be beneficial, Mr. Hage. For one thing, it would reduce some of
the complexity around the country of origin determinations. Third, I would
suggest some good housekeeping is called for. Moving to mutual recognition
of standards and regulations in order to facilitate joint customs inspection and
reduce redundant paperwork while expediting FAST Track procedures. 2
Fourth, an economic area that I believe is right for more bilaterally and
just possibly trilaterally, would be energy. Particularly as the volatile
situation in the Middle East tightens, concern in North America about
dependence on foreign oil will increase. We could look together at more
efficient exploitation of reserves in North America and make a joint
commitment to develop new sources of energy; preferably without subsidies
or tax credits for extraction or transmission. Just in case anybody from
Alaska is in the room. A new electricity grid with more efficient, broader
channels of distribution would also be timely. In the same vein, we might try
to develop mutual and tangible commitments to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions blending. Commitments in the spirit of Kyoto reflecting the
reality of our North American economies. 13
12 Lenore Sek, Fast-Track Authority for Trade Agreements (Trade Promotion Authority):
Background and Developments in the 107th Congress, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH Service
Report B10084, May 14, 2001, available at www.ncseonline.org/nle/crsreports/
economics/econ- 128.cfm?&CFID= 11368903&CFTOKEN=7581945
13 The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
2003]
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I do not see labor mobility or common currency as a part of our next
agenda. Mexico has more interest in the former. While a common currency
may have merit, I seriously doubt whether it would attract any support in
Washington, let alone Ottawa. That is assuming, of course, that common
means something other than the U.S. dollar. The fact that labor mobility is a
major priority for Mexico illustrates to me that a trilateral approach initially
would be more likely to stumble over different, if not competing agendas.
Just as NAFTA followed the FTA extending and in some instances
improving the terms for all three parties, I believe future negotiations have a
better chance of success if they proceed in phases.
In a nutshell, I am contending that by combining mutual priorities for
greater physical security and economic security we could embark on a bold
agenda of next steps aimed at establishing twin pillars of pragmatism to the
benefit of both countries. If we were able to forge new agreements in these
areas, I believe we would need some new institutional arrangements to
support their implementation and an end to maintain political oversight. A
permanent Joint Council on Homeland Security and a North American
Commission on economic security would represent a good start with political
as well as bureaucratic levels underpinning each. The model for the former
could be the Permanent Joint Board on Defense,' 4 which nurtured
exceptional cooperation between Canada and the United States during World
War II. It is important that we involve both politicians and officials in these
institutions. Regular reviews of the political level would be intended to act
as a catalyst and a prod for action at the official level. I think it would also
help temper some of the inevitable concerns about sovereignty. Clearly, this
would be an ambitious agenda, one fraught with pitfalls, sensitivities and
obstacles, but if we are serious about turning our geography to our
advantage, these are the kinds of issues that should be addressed by our
leaders in the years ahead.
The Canadian Council of Chief Executives is advocating a broad series of
initiatives for a relationship with analyses and ideas reinforcing much of
what I suggested to you today. But success will not come from analyses or
careful deliberation involving business and academia. I say that with respect.
What is needed most of all is political leadership, a signal of willingness
from the top to explore possible means to these ends, along with the stamina
to see them through. I have no illusions on either account. The obstacles
available at www.unfccc.de/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.html (adopted by 159 nations in
Kyoto, Japan, on Dec. 11, 1997).
14 Canadian-American Permanent Joint Board on Defense, DEPT. OF STATE BULLETIN,
Aug. 24, 1940, available at www.ola.bc.ca/online/cf/documents/19400gdensburg
Agreement.html (established on the basis of the Ogdensburg Agreement on Hemispheric
Defense of August 17, 1940).
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range from complacency to hostility, the tyranny of the status quo and the
allergy against deeper association. Not much room for pragmatism,
especially if emotions take center stage. The best antidote, perhaps the only
antidote, is leadership.
While sensitivities about sovereignty are often seen as the relenting
preserving of Canadians, you may recall the binational Dispute Settlement
Panel in the Free Trade Agreement generated similar concerns from the U.S.
Legislators.' 5 But the track record of success from the Free Trade Agreement
and NAFTA, even with their limitations, is the best foundation for mutual
confidence; that is the prize of trying to do more is worth the effort. It would
be easier, perhaps more politically palatable, to contemplate incremental
steps; easier but not better. What we must resist above all else is a tendency
to coast or drift on the assumption that bold action is beyond our reach or not
worth the political capital it would require. The remarkable thing about the
Free Trade Agreement and NAFTA is that success emerged despite heavy
obstacles and strong emotions.
The power of a good idea should never be underestimated, least of all by
political leaders who concentrate excessively on polls rather than on policy
options. Leadership and perseverance paid dividends before for Canada and
the United States. It could happen again. It should happen again. Thank you
very much.
5 Ton J. M. Zuijdwijk, Dispute Settlement Mechanisms Under the Free Trade Agreement,
40 ME. L. REV. 325 (1988).
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